Chapter 1

Myths of Modernity and the Myth of the City: When the Historiography of Pre-modern Italy goes South

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When Petrarch went to Naples to be examined by Robert the Wise (r.1309–43) before his coronation as poet-laureate in 1341 and when Boccaccio set the plot of The Decameron Day II, tale 5 'Andreuccio da Perugia' after the Sicilian Vespers of 1282 in homage to his thirteen formative years in Naples (1327–41), these twin pillars of the Florentine Renaissance were acknowledging the moral and intellectual leadership in Italy of the Angevin king of Naples. Angevin Naples had been a papal investiture in 1265, which was created to replace the Hohenstaufen Holy Roman emperors in southern Italy after the contested succession following the death of Frederick II’s heir Conrad IV in 1254. This French cadet monarchy became a bulwark of the pro-papal, pro-French Guelph alliance against the centralized monarchical policy of the German imperialist Ghibelline party. With the defeat of Frederick II’s natural son Manfred at Benevento in 1266 and his grandson Conradin at Tagliacozzo in 1268, Guelph politics opened Angevin Naples to French Gothic forms of art with importation of French masters and craftsmen and commissions to Tuscan artists such as Giotto, Donatello and Michelozzo. A late medieval confluence of piety and aesthetics influenced both art and architecture (as attested by church construction in Naples from the beginning of Angevin rule – S. Lorenzo Maggiore, S. Domenico Maggiore, S. Chiara, S. Eligio, S. Maria Donnaregina and the Duomo), as well as literature and learning in the Neapolitan court.

1 John T. Paoletti and Gary M. Radke, Art in Renaissance Italy (3rd edn, London, 2005), 'Naples: Art for a Royal Kingdom,' pp. 124–34 documents the art and architecture of the new Angevin dynasty in Naples from the last third of the thirteenth century with the importation of foreign artists by Charles I; Giotto’s residence at court 1328–32 'actively producing frescoes and panel paintings, now lost'; the tomb of Robert the Wise in Santa Chiara by the Florentine sculptors Pacio and Giovanni Bertini (1343–45); and 'Donatello and Michelozzo in Naples,' pp. 242–3 describes the funerary monument commissioned by Cardinal Rainaldo Brancacci c.1425, which was 'carved largely in a workshop that Donatello set up in Pisa and then assembled in Naples' for the frescoed chapel in Sant’Angelo a Nilo.

San Domenico Maggiore in Naples, a great Gothic structure built under Angevin patronage from 1283 to 1324, was the cornerstone of the Dominican monastic complex in the kingdom’s capital and also served as the seat of the University of Naples. San Domenico stands in the heart of the old city at the top of a large piazza around the corner from the seat of the noble city district of Nido, and was the neighbourhood church of such Nido noble families as the Carafa, d’Avalos, Brancaccio, Pignatelli, Spinelli and Orsini. It became the preferred church of the Neapolitan nobility in the Renaissance; in the second half of the fifteenth century, the Aragonese court made it their royal chapel. From 1494 Aragonese coffins were collected and stored there, where they remained neglected until the 1590s. High atop the armoires where the walls meet the vaulted ceiling in its sacristy, forty-five caskets of Aragonese royals and high noble retainers were restored, systematized and rededicated in 1594 under the patronage of Philip II (r. in Naples, 1554–98) as a royal pantheon for four generations of the Neapolitan Aragonese. These abandoned Aragonese sarcophagi held the remains of the heirs of Alfonso V, who in 1442 had taken the Neapolitan mainland from the Angevins. Now a century and a half later, asserting the unified Spanish monarchy’s continuity with and legitimacy of his Aragonese inheritance, Philip II reclaimed the deceased Aragonese conquerors as direct ancestors and founders of his Spanish imperial domains in the Mediterranean.

The Aragonese conqueror Alfonso had made the city of Naples the capital of a Mediterranean empire fuelled by trade led by Catalan merchants and bound by Aragón, Sardinia, Southern Italy and Sicily with title to Athens and Jerusalem. After a century of internal conflict and warfare following the death of Robert the Wise in 1343, Alfonso ruled the two Sicilies, the southern Italian mainland and the island of Sicily (Regnum Siciliae Citra et Ultra Farum), as separate kingdoms. Alfonso’s Neapolitan kingdom, however, was later split off from Aragón at his death in 1458 with his illegitimate son, Ferrante I (r.1458–94), succeeding him in Naples and his brother, John II (r.1458–79), father of Ferdinand the Catholic (r.1479–1516), in Sicily and the Aragonese possessions. But an independent Aragonese dynasty in Naples was to be short-lived; for, barely fifty years after Alfonso’s conquest, the French invasions of 1494 brought his Angevin rivals in the person of the king of France, Charles VIII (r.1483–98), back into Italy to conquer Naples. In Guicciardini’s ironic parody, Charles conquered even before he came and saw. The southern Italian Kingdom of Naples became the great

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4 Francesco Guicciardini, *Storia d’Italia*, online at http://www.filosofico.net/guicciardinistoriaditalia1.htm: bk 1, ch. 19: ‘Con la quale celebrità [Carlo] andato a visitare la chiesa maggiore, fu dipoi, perché Castelnuovo si teneva per g’innemici, condotto a alloggiare in Castelcapuano, già abitazione antica de’ re francesi: avendo con maraviglioso corso di inaudita felicità, sopra l’esempio ancora di Giulio Cesare, prima vinto che veduto.’
prize tempting both France’s Louis XII (r. 1498–1515) and the unified Spanish monarchy of Castile and Aragón under Ferdinand the Catholic and Isabella of Castile to return in 1499 and carve up the kingdom between themselves in the Treaty of Granada in 1500. Soon thereafter the Spanish expelled the French and established a 200-year viceroyalty beginning with their victory at Garigliano on 29 December 1503 and ending with the occupation of Naples by the Austrian Habsburgs in 1707 during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14).

I have evoked the haunting images of contested crowns, caskets and conquests in this well-known chronology in order to highlight the complex exchange and interaction between the Italian north and south, and between the Italian states and their neighbouring states in Spain, France and Germany. In order to integrate these actions and events into a unified history, we must reject viewing them from the vantage point of a single state or a single national tradition. We might best begin by asking a series of questions about two simple, but often misunderstood problems concerning the relationship between politics and culture in the period between the fourteenth- and seventeenth-century crises that bracketed the Renaissance in Italy. First, with regard to the origins of the conflicts, how and why were successor states in the Italian south conquered? Why did Angevin Naples collapse, the Aragonese successfully conquer Naples, the Italian Wars of 1494 bring an end to the Neapolitan Aragonese dynasty, the Spanish conquer Naples and, after almost a century of a pax hispanica, the Spanish in turn lose Naples? In other words, some may have won their battles, but who won the wars? Can the history of Naples move beyond its stereotype as an unstable kingdom in constant decline, its chronicle of conquests and revolutions, and its long-standing division into dynastic periods? Second, how does the oscillation between dynastic victory and defeat for the Kingdom of Naples relate to the idea of modernity, an interpretive concept associated with the Renaissance in Italy ever since 1860 when Burckhardt found the modern state and modern individualism personified in Frederick II? Or, to put it another way, why are politics so central to our understanding of Italian Renaissance culture? With all its wars, was there no Renaissance in Naples and the south? To answer these questions we must re-examine the contingency of events and understand how states were maintained or lost.

Recent scholarship has been de-centring the story of the Renaissance in Italy from a ‘tale of two [or sometimes three] cities’ – Florence, Venice and sometimes Rome – to a pan-Italian story grounded in three common registers: the control of property, production and labour; the exchange of people, goods and ideas; and local varieties of the evolving inheritance of Latin language, Roman law

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and the Latin Church. I propose here that this period, with all its brilliance and baggage, cannot be understood without emphasizing the ways in which northern and southern Italy were intimately related, not in terms of the dualism of the 'two Italies', but as integrated parts of economic, social, political and cultural systems based on similar rules and rituals constantly appropriating and assimilating products and peoples peninsula-wide, and how that equilibrium dramatically diverged at the end of the Renaissance during the seventeenth-century crisis. The history of northern Italy cannot be understood without the south, and southern Italy without the north. The role of the papacy is central to the story in its political conflicts with the German Holy Roman emperor and the French monarchy, while regional lords and internal factions sided with one or another of the contending parties – popes or anti-popes, emperors or kings – in their attempts to gain ascendancy over their rivals. For the Italian south, then, history is not a series of dynasties and conquests with one thing after another; rather, these bonds of exchange and conflict – the forming and breaking of solidarities – suggest the possibility of writing a unified history above the surface squabbles of the vying internal and external actors.

To ask, then, the first question, who conquered and controlled Naples, would be to return to the point of departure for Machiavelli in The Prince: how to gain and maintain a new state. Not by chance, writing in 1513 almost two decades into the Italian Wars following the French Invasion of 1494, Machiavelli frames his central argument around two examples presented at the beginning in Chapter 1 and repeated near the end in Chapter 24: Naples conquered by Alfonso V of Aragón in 1442 and Milan conquered by Francesco Sforza in 1450. In his characteristic binary logic, Machiavelli argues that the calamities of Italy derived primarily from the failure of Italian armies (for him, only citizen militias could restore Italian rule); or, if a state had strong armies, because the people and/or the nobility opposed their ruler. In Chapter 24, the first of his three concluding chapters, Machiavelli lays blame on the lack of virtù among Italy’s leaders:

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Thus, these princes of ours, who have been in their principate for many years and subsequently lose it, should not blame fortune, but rather their own sloth, because they never thought during quiet times that things could change. (This is a common failing of men; they never take account of their affairs in the eye of a storm.) ... The only good, certain, and durable defenses are those that depend on you yourself from your own virtù.7

Again Machiavelli repeats his key metaphor of imprinting form onto matter in the middle of Chapter 26, which I read to be addressing the Medici princes – the initial dedicatee, Giuliano (duke of Nemours), and after his death in 1516, the revised dedicatee, Lorenzo (duke of Urbino), but above all the unnamed head of the family, Giovanni (the newly elected Pope Leo X [r.1513–21]) – whom Machiavelli is exhorting to unite Italy and to whom he is ingratiating himself for employment:

And in Italy matter is not lacking on which to impress forms of every sort. There is great virtù in the limbs if only it were not lacking in the heads. You may see that in duels and combats between small numbers, the Italians have been much superior in force, skill, and inventiveness. But when it is a matter of armies, Italians cannot be compared with foreigners. All this comes from the weakness of the heads, because those who know are not obeyed, and with everyone seeming to know, there has not been up to the present time anyone who has known how to raise himself so high through both virtù and fortune that the others would yield to him.8

Machiavelli argues that the problem is not individual Italian arms, but Italian armies; armies have failed because of the lack of vigorous leadership, the absence in Italy not of men of virtù, but of the one man of virtù whom the others are willing to obey and accept as their leader.

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7 Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ed. Luigi Firpo (Turin, 1972), ch. 24, online at http://www.liberliber.it/biblioteca/m/machiavelli/il_principe/html/princi_d.htm#capitolo24: ‘Per tanto, questi nostri principi, che erano stati molti anni nel principato loro, per averlo di poi perso non accusino la fortuna, ma la ignavia loro: perché, non avendo mai ne’ tempi quieti pensato che possono mutarsi, (il che è comune defetto delli uomini, non fare conto nella bonaccia della tempesta) … E quelle difese solamente sono buone, sono certe, sono durabili, che dependono da te proprio e dalla virtù tua.’ 

8 Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ch. 26, online at http://www.liberliber.it/biblioteca/m/machiavelli/il_principe/html/princi_d.htm#capitolo26: ‘et in Italia non manca materia da introdurvi ogni forma. Qui è virtù grande nelle membra, quando non la mancassi ne’ capi. Specchiatevi ne’ duelli e ne’ congressi de’ pochi, quanto li Italiani siano superiori con le forze, con la destrezza, con lo ingegno. Ma, come si viene alli eserciti, non compariscono. E tutto procede dalla debolezza de’ capi; perché quelli che sanno non sono obediti, et a ciascuno pare di sapere, non ci sendo fino a qui alcuno che si sia saputo rilevare, e per virtù e per fortuna, che li altri cedino.’
Guicciardini similarly castigates the ‘ill-advised measures of rulers’ whose ‘foolish errors’ and ‘short-sighted greed’ led them to mistake ‘the frequent shifts of fortune’, abuse their power and ‘become the cause of new perturbations either through lack of prudence or excess of ambition’ that shattered his idealized portrait of a tranquil paradise before 1494. For Guicciardini, while our problems may be determined by the stars, their cause lies in ourselves, especially in those powerful rulers among us who have subverted the common good for their own advantage. David Abulafia has shown, however, that Guicciardini’s history is not always an accurate one. The portrait of the weak and imbecilic Charles VIII is a gross mischaracterization, as are those flattering reveries of Lorenzo de’ Medici and distortions of Ferrante I of Naples. Later, after a description of French misrule upon their conquest of Naples in 1495, the caprice of the Neapolitan nobility whom the French disadvantaged and the recall of the Aragonese dynasty despite its many faults, however, Guicciardini’s patrician analysis lays primary blame for the kingdom’s unstable government on the fickle nature of the Neapolitan popolo.

Such is the nature of the people, who are inclined to hope more than they ought to, and tolerate less than is necessary, and to be always dissatisfied with the present state of affairs. Especially is this true of the inhabitants of the kingdom of Naples, who among all the peoples of Italy are most noted for their instability and thirst for innovations.

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9 Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. Sidney Alexander (New York, 1969), bk 1, ch. 1: ‘those ill-advised measures of rulers who act solely in terms of what is in front of their eyes: either foolish errors or short-sighted greed. Thus by failing to take account of the frequent shifts of fortune, and misusing, to the harm of others, the power conceded to them for the common welfare, such rulers become the cause of new perturbations either through lack of prudence or excess of ambition.’ For the Italian text, see http://www.filosofico.net/guicciardiniistoriaditalia1.htm: ‘quanto siano perniciosi, quasi sempre a se stessi ma sempre a’ popoli, i consigli male misurati di coloro che dominano, quando, avendo solamente innanzi agli occhi o errori vani o le cupidità presenti, non si ricordando delle spesse variazioni della fortuna, e convertendo in detrimento altrui la potestà conceduta loro per la salute comune, si fanno, poca prudenza o per troppa ambizione, autori di nuove turbazioni.’


11 Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, bk 2, ch. 4, p. 90. For the Italian text, see http://www.filosofico.net/guicciardiniistoriaditalia1.htm: ‘Tale è la natura de’ popoli, inclinata a sperare più di quel che si debbe e a tollerare manco di quel ch’è necessario, e ad avere sempre in fastidio le cose presenti; e specialmente degli abitatori del regno di Napoli, i quali tra tutti i popoli d’Italia sono notati di instabilità e di cupidità di cose nuove.’
The popolo’s ‘instabilità’ and ‘cupidità di cose nuove’ would become a commonplace in the acerbic attacks on the ‘vile’ people during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Very simply, reading Italian history as if it were Florentine history (a particular Anglo-American fault) or reading the stories of the winners and not taking seriously the losers (in this case, Milan and Naples) misses what was important about the jockeying for power among the five great-power signatories of the Peace of Lodi both before and after their mutual-defence pact in 1454. If we return to Guicciardini and ask what he identifies as the immediate cause of the French Invasion of 1494 and the Italian Wars that followed, we find that it was the sale of those castles at Anguillara and Cerveteri, and others near Rome by Franceschetto Cibo (Pope Innocent VIII’s natural son) to the Orsini that caused a shift in the balance of power and began to worry Ludovico Sforza in Milan. Then, in Guicciardini’s portrait of the impressionable Charles VIII with Sforza’s ambassador whispering in one ear, the exiled nephew of Sixtus IV (Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, the future Julius II) inciting him to action in the other, and numbers of exiled pro-French Neapolitan nobles fawning on his martial vanity as well, we have a picture of sophisticated foreign courtiers pandering to the young king of France, not unlike Machiavelli’s portrait of the plague of flatterers so common in courts who were ready to assert their self-serving desires as they preyed upon the self-deceptions of a malleable prince.¹²

If we go back to the origins of the French/Spanish rivalry and contending claims to Naples and southern Italy, however, we will see that the Angevin conquest over the Hohenstaufens and the subsequent Angevin-Aragonese Wars in the thirteenth century, the Angevin civil wars in the fourteenth century, the Angevin-Aragonese Wars of the fifteenth century, and the Italian Wars after 1494 were not the result of failed diplomacy, self-aggrandizing leaders or the popolo’s unrest alone. Rather, the rivalry for kingship in Naples and Sicily between pro-French and pro-Spanish forces (both internationally and domestically) was a continuation of the medieval conflict between papal and imperial factions of Guelphs and Ghibellines in Italy. This deep-rooted conflict manifested itself in southern Italy from the eleventh-century Norman conquest over the warring Byzantine, Lombard, Arab and native lords that had forged a new kingdom. The papacy’s intervention in southern Italian state-building dates from 1059 with the investiture of the Norman adventurer Robert Guiscard as a vassal as duke of Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, and his acknowledgement of papal feudal suzerainty. The shift from Byzantine Greek lordship to that of the Latin Church

¹² Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ch. 23, online at http://www.liberliber.it/biblioteca/m/machiavelli/il_principe/html/princi_d.htm#capitolo23: ‘E questi sono li adulatori, delli quali le corti sono piene; perché li uomini si compiacciono tanto nelle cose loro proprie et in modo vi si ingannono, che con difficoltà si difendano da questa peste; et a volersene defendere, si porta periculo di non diventare contennendo.’
brought papal legitimacy to Robert’s past and future conquests, and he became a defender of the pope against incursions into Italy by the German kings or Holy Roman emperors. The Guelph–Ghibelline conflict reasserted itself through the twelfth-century marriage of the Norman heiress Constance to the son of Frederick I Barbarossa (which was to put the kingdom under Hohenstaufen imperial lordship), the thirteenth-century marriage of the Hohenstaufen heiress, another Constance, to Peter III of Aragón (which gave the Aragonese their imperial claim), the fourteenth-century crisis and into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

‘The most eloquent statement of the Ghibelline case is undoubtedly the one put forward by Dante in his *De Monarchia*’ of the second decade of the fourteenth century. The most salient example of the Guelph versus Ghibelline paradigm would come later in 1440 with one of the crowning achievements of Renaissance humanism, Lorenzo Valla’s exposé of the forgery of the papal claim to temporal power in Rome, the spurious *Donation of Constantine*. Valla wrote his treatise in the employ of Alfonso of Aragón for the war against Eugenius IV in order to debunk the papal claim to temporal authority and, hence, lordship over Alfonso’s newly conquered Kingdom of Naples.

But dynastic rivalries and external wars were not at the core of the political weakness and instability of Neapolitan governments. Rather internal divisions fomented external conquest. Political and cultural rivalries within the Angevin (1268–1442) and Aragonese (1442–1503) states in Naples resulted from the divisions in the nobility (high and low, old and new, rich and poor, city and feudal), between the nobility and the *popolo*, and between all of them and the assertions of a centralizing monarchy.

As the Renaissance Italian states ‘lost their liberty’ (according to the humanist rhetoric on the meaning of the 1494 ‘calamity of Italy’), their learned culture paradoxically thrived and was imitated outside the peninsula. This disjunction between politics and culture, what Lauro Martines called ‘power and imagination,’ became the High Renaissance of Leonardo and Michelangelo. And it took place during a period of economic growth and recovery, what Fernand Braudel’s Einaudi *Storia d’Italia* essay, ‘Italia, fuori d’Italia’, referred to as the first third (1454–94) of three ‘Italies in two centuries’

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14 Lauro Martines, *Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy* (New York, 1979).
during the ‘long sixteenth century’ (1450–1650).15 A similar complaint about the loss of political autonomy lies behind much of the humanist lament upon the 1527 Sack of Rome as chronicled by Kenneth Gouwens.16 Certainly, if there ever was an argument for the self-referential use of humanist rhetoric, according to Martines’s definition of humanism as ‘propaganda for the ruling class’, the humanist tracts on the Sack of Rome provide the perfect evidence. As Eric Cochrane’s historiographical survey of post-Sack treatises suggests, counter-evidence from outside of Rome contains barely a ripple of recognition or response beyond the Roman humanists themselves.17 And Diana Robin has shown that the humanists fleeing the Sack of Rome would soon find refuge and nurture in a proto-salon patronized by noblewomen on Ischia.18 Political crises could often lead to creative responses even in the midst of political uncertainty, declining political fortunes and outright military defeat.

The second question, how to measure modernity and the problem of solidarity, takes us to the teleological myths of modernity (individualism, republicanism, capitalism, realism, secularism and eventually nationalism). Such myths of modernity have reinforced the paradigm of Italian dualism (the two Italies, north and south) and the myth of the medieval communes (the precocious development and divergence of northern Italy’s cities and towns from those of the Mezzogiorno) as an explanation for the continuity of the separation of institutions and values between north and south to the present.19

The classic statement on the medieval Italian commune as the central unifying principle during the Risorgimento comes from Carlo Cattaneo’s 1858 essay on ‘The City as an Ideal Principle in Italian Histories’.20 Cattaneo championed variety and progress in the city, as a dynamic place of amity and ever-widening union among peoples – ideas that have been distorted and misinterpreted by the contemporary Italian Lombard League and Northern League who have adopted him as an ancestor.21 Martin Thom succinctly sums up Cattaneo’s thought:

18 Diana Robin, Publishing Women: Salons, the Presses, and the Counter-Reformation in Sixteenth-Century Italy (Chicago, 2007).
At the least, we must question the claims made by the Northern League, in Italy, and, to a lesser extent, by neo-populist admirers of the leagues in other countries, to Cattaneo’s legacy. Deploying Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction, they have elaborated arguments regarding the universal and the particular, or the global and the local, that the author of the essay on the city would have rejected out of hand. For Cattaneo regarded local liberties and locally pursued truth as the necessary precondition of a more general association, and not as entrenched (and, in modern parlance, communitarian) obstacles to transaction and dialogue. In this regard he was a liberal, who celebrated diversity at every level, and a radical, committed to a thorough democratization of European societies. Cattaneo’s understanding of the city as an ideal principle in Italian histories reflected both of these facets of his political thought.22

Contemporary political scientists and sociologists have taken up these themes in their analysis of the relationship between cities and states, the creation of civil society, civic norms and networks, and making modern democracies work by returning to history to explain how state formation developed from ancient times to the present.23

Anthony Molho has explored how contemporary ideas and political agendas have influenced the ways that American scholars have read history, especially in finding the origins of modernity in the history of the Renaissance. He argues that there are two contrasting approaches to modernity in the study of the Renaissance in America: 1) a celebratory praise of Renaissance contributions to the making of Western Civilization as ‘a great advance of moral and cultural values’; or 2) an anti-modernist praise for the Renaissance as an alternative vision to the ‘pernicious forces’ and ‘refuge from the degrading conditions of contemporary society’.24 These two approaches both see the Renaissance as a positive force, whereas it is modernity that is viewed with either a positive or a negative valence. For Molho, the influence of German-Jewish exiles from the 1930s upon Anglo-American studies of the Renaissance cannot be overestimated in broadening earlier interests in the Renaissance as the key moment in European civilization. Their emphasis on historical method and their ideological orientation towards the study of the past as ‘inseparable from the notion of Bildung, the idea that education must serve to improve and strengthen an individual’s character, and


by so doing reinforce the bourgeois order’ redirected the whole field of study.\textsuperscript{25} Felix Gilbert (1905–91) recorded his impression of Renaissance studies in England upon his arrival in October 1933,

I was surprised and somewhat shocked that in England in the 1930s study of the Renaissance was left exclusively to art and literary historians. Machiavelli seemed a somewhat questionable subject ... he was not in the line of (Hugo) Grotius, (John) Locke, or Adam Smith, which made human freedom a cornerstone of political life. The suspicion ... that Machiavelli was really an advocate of the devil lingered on.\textsuperscript{26}

From an American historiographical perspective, ‘The Italian Renaissance, Made in the USA’ would appear to be more about the US than about Italy, with the idealized image of US ‘exceptionalism’ transposed to Florentine or Venetian ‘exceptionalism’. In his 1965 inaugural address as president of the American Historical Association, for example, the great economic historian of Venice Frederic Lane famously argued for a new periodization for the transition from medieval to modern based upon the linkage between republicanism and free trade:

An alternative is to treat the economic growth, the elaboration of republican institutions, and the changing artistic and intellectual climate as a closely connected whole spread over a period extending at least from 1200 to 1600, or possibly all the way from Sebastian Ziani [who in 1172 was the first doge chosen by electors rather than the popular assembly] to George Washington, an Age of Preindustrial Republicanism.\textsuperscript{27}

Such almost exclusive emphasis on Florentine or Venetian exceptionalism typifies how the ideology and preconceptions of Anglo-American scholars have prompted their studies of Renaissance Italy to diverge from the development of the field in Italy itself. Until relatively recently it has appeared that we were speaking past one another – with the Anglo-Americans only beginning to pay lip-service to a Renaissance beyond the Arno or the Lagoon, and only slowly over time has there been a reciprocal interaction and historiographical exchange.

\textsuperscript{25} Molho, ‘The Italian Renaissance’, p. 272.


encompassing a broader vision of all the early modern states of Italy. But even in the more inclusive perspective of Italian historiography on the pre-modern Italian states, the story has too often been one early modern state juxtaposed against another without an organizing principle or comparative logic in an apparently Pirandellian condition of many states in search of an author.

If we return to Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy itself in the midst of the Italian Wars in the early sixteenth century, there is not yet a north/south divide. For Machiavelli, the great question is Italy’s division into numerous states because of the absence of a foundational leader, such as Moses, Cyrus, Romulus or Theseus, with the tension between individualism and society, as we have seen, lying at the heart of the problem. To repeat, Machiavelli maintains that the leader who is a man of virtù cannot succeed because ‘those who know are not obeyed, and each man thinks he knows’ (‘a ciascuno pare di sapere’, literally, ‘some knowledge appears to each one’). Machiavelli argues that an extreme kind of individualism in Italy, one in which every citizen follows his own counsel and cannot follow a leader, has led to the loss of liberty. For Machiavelli in 1513, necessity now calls for a strong man to forge and maintain good arms and good laws out of citizen solidarity, which Italian inability to subordinate the individual to a leader of virtù has prevented.

Thus, Machiavelli’s binary logic as developed in The Discourses holds sway in his understanding of how social structure determined the form of government:

Where there is equality (as in the German republics), a prince cannot be established; where there is no equality (as in the Kingdom of Naples), a republic cannot be established. (bk 1, ch. 55)28

Machiavelli argued that two kinds of ‘idle’ noblemen were most dangerous: those who lived in luxury on the labour of others and even worse, those who commanded castles and had subjects of their own.

These two types of men abound in the Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy. This is the reason why in these provinces there has never appeared any republic or well-ordered government. Where the substance is so corrupt that laws do not suffice to restrain it, there it is necessary to order matters with greater force; this is the hand of a king, and such absolute power

28 Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago, 1996), p. 109. The quotation is from the title of bk 1, ch. 55. For the Italian text, see http://www.classicitaliani.it/machiav/mac36.htm#55: ‘Quanto facilmente si conduchino le cose in quella città dove la moltitudine non è corrotta: e che, dove è equalità, non si può fare principato; e dove la non è, non si può fare republica.’
as will restrain the excessive ambition and corruption of the overmighty. (bk 1, ch. 55)  

Notice that Machiavelli makes no distinction between north and south. Naples in the south, the Papal States in Central Italy, and the Romagna and Lombardy in the north are referenced by their political organization, as principalities to be contrasted with republics, not as states differentiated by regional, geographic, socio-economic or ideological divisions.

If a new politics is the distinctive feature of modernity, local republicanism was omnipresent in guilds and communes in the Italian south as much as in the north; while by the sixteenth century, northern Italian liberties expressed nostalgia for an illusory medieval republicanism. The northern Italian medieval communes were congenitally riven by internal divisions among citizens, separated from one another by regional factionalism and increasingly subject to the concentrated power of oligarchic elites or petty princes. On northern Italian republicanism, Gene Brucker reminds us how the Medici consistently seized power and undermined republican government and values in Florence and Tuscany from the 1430s to the 1490s and again in the 1510s on their way to becoming dukes of Florence and establishing an absolutist state in the 1530s.

For southern Italian participatory democratic institutions, I have documented the Dogana di Foggia’s guild parliament among sheep-owners, the generalità dei locati, with evidence of independently elected representatives from the early fifteenth century; Silvio Zotta has described local town councils’ arguments over grain prices and production in the feudal state of the Doria princes of Melfi in the famines of the late sixteenth century; Caroline Castiglione has introduced us to the seventeen-century debates and writing of village resistance in the Barbarini estates in the Roman countryside. For the peninsula in general, Nicholas  

29 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 111. For the Italian text, see http://www.classicalitalian.it/machiav/mac36.htm#55: ‘Di queste due spezie di uomini ne sono pieni il regno di Napoli, Terra di Roma, la Romagna e la Lombardia. Di qui nasce che in quelle province non è mai surta alcuna repubblica né alcuno vivere politico; perché tali generazioni di uomini sono al tutto inimici d’ogni civilità. Ed a volere in provincie fatte in simil modo introdurre una repubblica, non sarebbe possibile: ma a volerle riordinare, se alcuno ne fusse arbitro, non sarebbe altra via che farvi uno regno. La ragione è questa che, dove è tanto la materia corrotta che le leggi non bastano a frenarla, vi bisogna ordinare insieme con quelle maggior forza; la quale è una mano regia, che con la potenza assoluta ed eccessiva ponga freno alla eccessiva ambizione e corruttela de’ potenti.’


Terpstra uses Bologna under papal rule as a counter-example to the ideal of a late medieval republican exceptionalism in politics, economics and religion by documenting the dynamic between civil (‘aggressive localism’) and uncivil (‘negotiated absolutism’) society. Most important is the magisterial study of Gérard Delille on family, lineage and factions in comparative perspective of three diverse systems of southern Europe (southern Italy and the Iberia of Catalonia and Castile, northern and central Italy, and Provence in southern France). Delille presents a nuanced comparison of ubiquitous local, republican traditions as expressed in the rivalry between noble elites and the popolo in their relationship between local and central power and their change over time from the fifteenth to nineteenth century. What was operative across southern Europe was the kind of ‘continuous litigation’ that Edward Muir identifies as a typical way of adjudicating disputes and the kind of civic religion that made every city and town a ceremonial one that promoted citizen solidarity. In sum, north and south met more in the middle, with the north having less and the south more of republican tradition and local democratic culture than Robert Putnam’s influential (but anachronistic) generalizations on civic traditions allow.

If new social and economic forms are the distinctive features of modernity, were they derived from the rise of the bourgeoisie or the birth of capitalism? Martines argues that the political formation of the Italian city-state was a peculiarly northern Italian phenomenon resulting from the unique history of its independent, feudal kingdoms. Putnam relates his analysis of viable democratic political institutions in Making Democracy Work to social bonds by contrasting ‘vertical bonds of dependency and exploitation’ to ‘horizontal bonds of mutual solidarity’ and emphasizing the need for the development of

35 Putnam, Making Democracy Work; and for its critique, Nicholas Eckstein and Nicholas Terpstra (eds), Sociability and its Discontents: Civil Society, Social Capital, and their Alternatives (Turnhout, 2009).
36 Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 12, ‘We have seen that the peninsula had several sovereignties – royal, papal, Byzantine, and independent. Only one, however, offered the environment for city-states, the feudal kingdom of upper Italy: land of bellicose cities, communes, and astonishing urban energies.’ The Italian south, therefore, is excluded from his analysis: ‘To the far south, finally, were the Italo-Byzantine cities of Naples, Amalfi, and Gaeta, and mentioning them must suffice, for these cities had a different tradition and history.’
social capital. Sociology of the Italian south has been heavily influenced by Edward C. Banfield's ahistorical and oft rebutted *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958) and its finding of an ethos of 'amoral familism' (which Peter Burke prefers to call 'moral' familism, that is, the idea that there is no moral bond outside the family). If socio-economic development is dependent on the Italian city-state's civil society or later from the post-plague concentration of wealth into fewer hands, one would find both a middle class and merchant capitalism in abundance throughout the medieval Italian communes, with twenty-two mainland cities already having a population greater than 20,000 by 1300 and still twenty-two cities with population greater than 20,000 in 1600.

The problem here is to define the origins of inequality (those 'haves and have-nots') and identify the contradictions between individuality and community to examine how the individual and society were paradoxically both mutually exclusive and mutually reinforcing. Does the common good replace private interest? Does the market rule; or does culture ('taste') play some role in decision-making? Is sustained growth the necessary component of modernity? Could an Old Regime economic system not reach equilibrium?

If new ideologies defined modernity, did the religious reform of the sixteenth century and the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century pass by Italy? Was 'the eclipse of communal republicanism, and the socioeconomic progress it had spawned, [due] to the Counter-Reformation, which shielded Italy from the influence of the Protestant ethic that linked individual salvation and social responsibility'? The precocious late medieval and early modern Italian economy disproves Max Weber's claims that the spirit of capitalism depends on Protestant other-worldliness.

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39 John A. Marino, *Becoming Neapolitan: Citizen Culture in Baroque Naples* (Baltimore, 2011), pp. 35–6 identifies twenty-two cities with population greater than 20,000 before the plague, five of them falling below 20,000 by 1600, but five other cities growing to more than 20,000 by 1600.


historians of Germany by Constantin Fasolt and Thomas Brady emphasizes that post-Reformation Germany shows both continuity to the Middle Ages and little divergence from post-Tridentine Europe. Or was modernity about the rediscovery and reintegration of the classics from Giotto and Petrarch in the arts and literature? The variants of humanism that adapted rhetorical techniques of verbal and visual culture to support princes or popolo – the Neapolitan variant from the fifteenth-century Aragonese court has been dubbed feudal humanism – suggest that the pan-Italian movement of learning and literature did not easily distinguish between principalities and republics or north and south. Again stereotypes about progress and universality take precedence over contingency and local particularities in such formulations.

A better strategy for a comparative history of the pre-modern Italian states would be to identify the nodes of cohesion and points of conflict, which are often mirror images of one another and might best be called dynamic interactions among what I have been calling the commonalities of the control of property, production and labour, the exchange of people, goods and ideas, and the development of the traditions of Roman law, language and religion. Putnam’s ‘social capital’ seeks to find trust, norms and networks that create social equilibrium, rather than dependence. But the kinds of binary oppositions imbedded in society and economy – cities and countryside, rulers and ruled, ecclesiastical courts and civil courts, nobles and commoners, laity and clerics, fiscal systems and economic entrepreneurs, rich and poor, male and female, centre and peripheries, local power and the growth of the territorial state – all seem incompatible with the kind of republican virtue extolled. Rather, I would argue that equilibrium could only be reached with the establishment of a balance of conflict through constant negotiation due to the competition between contending interest groups.

How did this work in practice? Spanish Naples (1504–1713) demonstrated how imperial ‘balance of conflict’ or classical ‘divide and conquer’ should operate. Gonsalvo de Córdoba’s entrance into the capital in January 1504, his appointment as first Spanish viceroy and his successors up to the dissolution of the last invading French army in southern Italy in 1528 not only put a strong man in charge but also restored near universal, imperial rule in Italy. Under Charles V (1516–56), Philibert de Châlon, prince of Orange, Neapolitan viceroy (1528–30), eradicated and replaced the Francophile nobility in Naples with Spanish loyalist vassals, such as the Genoese Andrea Doria who was made one of the kingdom’s most powerful feudal lords as prince of Melfi; and Charles V

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further stabilized all of Italy with the annexation of Milan and the marriage of Eleonora of Toledo (the Neapolitan viceroy’s daughter) to Cosimo I de’ Medici (1537–74) of Florence. Under Philip II, the Council of Italy oversaw Neapolitan (along with Sicilian and Milanese) affairs after 1558. The Neapolitan viceroyalty fostered the development of a new class of judicial magistrates (togati), whose legal and administrative expertise furthered the bureaucratization of the kingdom and acted as a wedge against baronial authority. Genoese merchants entered Neapolitan trade and finance with greater frequency to tie it ever tighter to Philip’s imperial structure. Although an absentee monarch meant the loss of Neapolitan political independence, Spanish rule provided for political stabilization through protection against foreign invasion from France or the Ottoman Turks, subordination of the unruly nobility and establishment of long-lasting bureaucratic and legal traditions within an imperial framework.

Thus, with Charles V’s imperial reign and his son Philip II’s imperial system, we’ve come full circle in the Angevin–Aragonese conflict to the victory of the imperial forces and the imposition of the imperial programme over all – even those dead royals commemorated in the rafters of San Domenico Maggiore.

This two-century association of the kingdoms of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, but also the dukedom of Milan, with imperial Spain rose and fell with the Spanish Habsburg fortunes. As we know from the problematic, so-called decline of Spain already visible by the end of Philip II’s reign in the 1590s, the relationship between Spain and Italy was subject to criticism from both those within and those outside of Spanish rule. Within Italy, the reaction to the political, social and cultural relationship between Spain and Italy crystallized in the new cultural challenges of modernity from Bruno, Campanella, Galileo and Sarpi, in the economic realignment resulting from the seventeenth-century crisis and in the political challenges to Spanish rule that took their most extreme form during the revolts of 1647 in Naples and 1674 in Messina. Antispagnolismo, the subject of an important 2002 conference at the University of Salerno organized by Aurelio Musi, is defined as the anti-Spanish polemic that blames the 200-year Spanish occupation of Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for a multitude of sins: ‘bad government’ (bureaucratic corruption and favouritism, administrative negligence and disorder, parasitical fiscal exploitation and monarchical–local elite alliances as part of a divide and conquer strategy), ‘the military arm of the Counter-Reformation’ (the ‘Black legend’ of the Inquisition, American Indian genocide and the Spanish–papal alliance), ‘oppression of all liberties’ (political, religious, cultural repression and the squelching of dissent; the explosion

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of revolt) and 'the apothecism of a formal, external civic culture' ('a religion without interior faith, based on conformism, hypocrisy, and dissimulation').\footnote{45 Aurelio Musi, ‘Fonti e forme dell'antispagnolismo nella cultura italiana tra Ottocento e Novecento’, in Aurelio Musi (ed.), Alle origini di una nazione: antispagnolismo e identità italiana (Milan, 2003), pp. 12–13.} Antispagnolismo mutated over time from contemporary criticism of the Spanish imperial system to critics like Paolo Mattia Doria (1667–1746) in the immediate aftermath of Spanish rule such that it became a standard rallying cry of the Neapolitan Enlightenment and one of the most powerful foundational myths of the Risorgimento. Musi shows how Francesco De Sanctis’s \textit{Storia della letteratura italiana} (1870–71) and his negative critique of Guicciardini gave rise to three corollaries of the anti-Spanish polemic: the decadence of Italy from the time of the Peace of Lodi in 1454, the increasing separation of Italy from Europe after the Renaissance, and the teleological nationalism of Unification that finds a series of lost opportunities towards Unity. Likewise Gianvittorio Signorotto reminds us of De Sanctis’s \textit{uomo del Guicciardini}, whose self-interest short-circuited the national project.\footnote{46 Gianvittorio Signorotto, ‘Dalla decadenza alla crisi della modernità: la storiografia sulla Lombardia spagnola’, in Musi, Alle origini di una nazione, p. 314 with the ‘Guicciardinian man’ described in Francesco De Sanctis, ‘L'uomo del Guicciardini’, \textit{Nuova Antologia} (October 1869).} Understanding how antispagnolismo grew and developed over time as it metabolized ever broader critiques and new political agendas helps us understand that once upon a time there was a history of Naples before the questione meridionale.

The \textit{problema del Mezzogiorno}, as we know it, was a creation of the mid-nineteenth century to explain southern ‘backwardness’ after the fact.\footnote{47 Moe, \textit{View from Vesuvius}, p. 1 summarizes his thesis, ‘a modern vision of the Italian south, or Mezzogiorno, took form in the middle decades of the nineteenth century under the combined pressures of western Eurocentrism, nationalism, and bourgeoisification.’} Nineteenth-century French romanticism, Victorian aestheticism, German idealism and Risorgimento nationalism all inserted their ideological preconceptions on the Italian past to construct a seductive modernity for their time and people. This kind of modernity was very different from what Petrarch had in mind in rejecting the Middle Ages and its peoples who were in the middle between his times and the ancients. Although the people of early modern Italy’s multiple, regional states did not see themselves divided into north and south, they did see themselves in crisis. That crisis of the seventeenth century encompasses a wide range of political, economic, social and cultural phenomena from the Thirty Years War to the anti-Spanish revolts in Flanders, Catalonia, Portugal, Naples and Messina; from the fiscal demands of the wars to the economic stagnation and the demographic crisis of plague (1630 in Milan and 1656 in Naples), from the increased feudal repression in the countryside and stifled social mobility in the towns.
This seventeenth-century crisis, rather than earlier divergences such as the twelfth- and thirteenth-century dualism in trade between the northern communes and the Norman kingdom of Sicily and southern Italy described by David Abulafia, was determinative for the present north/south divergence. Proposing ‘an alternate model for the late medieval economy’ of Sicily, Stephan Epstein presents a convincing argument for the definitive turn in the seventeenth-century crisis most forcefully in his epilogue on the origins of underdevelopment. Epstein summarizes three interpretations for this turning point: the consensus thesis of Rosario Villari, Giuseppe Galasso and Aurelio Lepre for a feudal repression in the countryside and rigidified social structures; an alternative explanation presented by Maurice Aymard for a breakdown during commercial integration with the north as southern dependency became a forced commercial autarchy; and Emilio Sereni’s ideas about the development of a ‘national’ market for consumer demand combined with Renato Zangheri’s emphasis on the role of markets in economic development. Epstein’s own proposal combines all three interpretations by pointing out how the differences in population growth, decline, recovery and economic performance diverged within different market structures that provided little opportunity for interregional specialization and integration. In corroboration from northern Italy, Paolo Malanima’s ideas on the seventeenth-century crisis are derived from his study of the economy of Tuscany and northern Italy, where he finds an ‘Italian trend’ different from the traditional explanation of relative decline. Instead of a flattening trend, which had the northern communes’ precocious development surpassed by northern European states, Malanima describes the late medieval Italian economy having reached maturity followed by decline:

The decline was precipitous both in the countryside and the cities during the sixteenth century; it slowed down in the seventeenth century particularly in the countryside, where a partial recovery took place in the second half of the century and the first half of the eighteenth century. When population rise accelerated, from the middle of the eighteenth century, per capita product fell more rapidly, reaching its lowest level between 1790 and 1820.

50 Paolo Malanima, ‘A Declining Economy: Central and Northern Italy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in Dandelet and Marino, Spain in Italy, pp. 383–403, at p. 410. Malanima, p. 385 describes Italy as having a mature agrarian economy. Maturity is here seen as the advanced condition of a society when the possibilities of further progress, within the borders of the available prevailing technology, are lacking. It was characterized by increasing population pressure, declining opportunities for investment, declining labor productivity, relatively static economic structure – and
In other words, the decline was long term and it was both relative and absolute. However we define it, the seventeenth-century crisis at the end of the Renaissance marks the economic divergence of Italy from the colonial powers and industrializing states of northern Europe, and of a more viable economic northern Italy from a more dependent, raw-material producing southern Italy.

The age of Renaissance, Reformation, New World encounters and exploitation, and the Spanish Golden Age gave rise to a myth shared in Naples – the largest city in the Spanish empire – of imperial grandeur, defence of the faith and warrior values. Almost simultaneously, the mocking denigration of Spanish arrogance, intolerance and weakness in its spiralling decline came to delegitimize Spanish power in Italy and create an anti-myth for a new Italian 'nation'. Giovanni Muto has demonstrated that the collapse of Charles V’s dream of an imperial *respublica Christiana* was the result of the impossibility of a common identity for the diverse territories and peoples under the Spanish Habsburg monarchy. The more Spanish theory and practice of empire were implemented, the more they were resisted.

While we are all democrats now living in an extended ‘Machiavellian moment’, that should not make us tone deaf to the arguments for a universal state and hopes for an alternative path to justice, solidarity and civil society à la Dante’s one world government, Machiavelli’s good arms and good laws, or Cattaneo’s universalist widening and inclusion of peoples. After all, the nineteenth century oversaw the nationalist aspirations for a united Italian state and the twentieth century witnessed another impossible dream of an economically united Europe rise from the ashes of war. Whether a twenty-first-century post-nationalist dream of a politically unified Europe falters under the threat of the collapse of monetary union from the mounting debt crisis or whether the Italian north and south divide after a century and a half of unification from regional prejudices and anti-immigrant discrimination remain open questions. The past does not predict the future; rather it reveals difficult truths and asks hard questions of the present.

consequently lower urbanization rate, slow social changes, and limited political and administrative transformations.’
